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CHAPTER 1 
Contracts 
SURVEY Stafft 
§ 1.1. Personal Liability Arising From the Use of DIB/A in Corporate 
Signatures and Court's Unwillingness to Infer Liquidated Damages from 
an Escrow Arrangement.* During the Survey year, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court, in Pedersen v. Leahy, 1 addressed two issues 
arising from a vendor's breach of a purchase and sale agreement. The 
first issue, one of first impression, was whether personal liability ensued 
from a purported corporate signature signed by an individual officer of 
the corporation followed by d/b/a (doing business as) and the corporate 
name. 2 In the Commonwealth the proper way to charge the principal or 
corporation, thereby avoiding personal liability for the officer or agent, 
is for the agent to sign indicating the corporation as the signatory party, 
and to indicate his or her agency capacity.3 Finding that the d/b/a signa-
ture did not fit into this agent/principal framework, the Court held the 
individual personally bound. 4 
The Court also considered, as a matter of first impression, whether an 
escrow arrangement implied a liquidated damages clause covering re-
maining construction work.5 A liquidated damage is a fixed sum agreed 
upon at the time the contract is entered into, which estimates the extent 
of damages that will be caused by a breach of contract.6 A contract may 
include such a clause, which fixes the extent of damages recoverable, 
where the damages will be "uncertain in nature or amount or difficult of 
ascertainment," and the sum is fair. 7 In Pedersen, the Court found that 
the escrow agreement was not a liquidated damages clause.8 These hold-
t Brian A. Berube, Joseph A. DiBrigida Jr., James P. Hawkins. 
*Brian A. Berube, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 1.1. '397 Mass. 689,493 N.E.2d 486 (1986). 
2 Pedersen, 397 Mass. at 690-91, 493 N.E.2d at 486-87. 
3 C. A. PEAIRS, JR., BUSINESS CORPORATIONS, vol. 13A MASS. PRACTICE SERIES § 487 
(2d ed. 1971). 
4 Pedersen, 397 Mass. at 691, 493 N.E.2d at 487. 
5 /d. at 692, 493 N.E.2d at 487-88. 
• Factory Realty Corp. v. Corbin-Holmes Shoe Co., 312 Mass. 325, 331, 44 N.E.2d 671, 
674 (1942) (quoting 5 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS§ 776 (3d 
ed. 1961)). 
7 25 C.J.S. Damages§ 101 (1966). 
8 Pedersen, 397 Mass. at 692, 493 N.E.2d at 487-88. 
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2 1986 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW § 1.1 
ings are important in understanding the range of liabilities arising from a 
seller's breach of a purchase and sale agreement for a lot of land and 
accompanying house. 
In Pedersen, the plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Pedersen, entered into a 
purchase and sale agreement with the defendant, Francis Leahy (Leahy), 
to purchase a house in Canton, Massachusetts.9 The defendant, Leahy, 
was the president and treasurer of Neponset Valley Builders, Inc. (Ne-
ponset Valley), a home construction business. Leahy also constructed 
homes individually and independent from Neponset Valley. 10 
The Pedersens submitted an offer to purchase property to Neponset 
Valley. Leahy personally signed the acceptance of the offer. 11 On October 
16, 1978, the Pedersens signed a purchase and sale agreement signed by 
Leahy as "Francis Leahy, DBA Neponset Valley Builders, Inc."12 The 
purchase and sale agreement also contained an "acceptance of deed" 
clause, ~hic~,qischarged the seller of any further obligations upon the 
l?Pr,rr'~ ll.Cc,~ptance of the deed, except for those obligations containing 
term£ requiring performance after acceptance of the deed. 13 At the clos-
ing, the Pedersens placed $750 of the purchase price in escrow to cover 
the remaining work to be done by LeahyY 
When Leahy failed to complete the remaining work, which amounted 
to a cost of $11 ,401, 15 the Pedersens brought an action for breach of 
contract. 16 On these facts the superior court found in favor of the Ped-
ersens, 17 and the defendant, Leahy, appealed. The Supreme Judicial 
Court took the case from the Appeals Court on its own initiative. 18 
9 /d. at 690, 493 N.E.2d at 486. 
10 /d. 
11 /d. at 690, 493 N.E.2d at 486-87. 
12 /d. at 690, 493 N.E.2d at 487. Other signatures and transactions that took place during 
this period included: An occupancy permit issued by the Town of Canton to Leahy. /d. On 
the actual deed, Neponset Valley appeared as the grantor of the deed. /d. Leahy signed 
the deed in an agency capacity, by executing it on behalf of Neponset Valley as its president 
and treasurer. /d. The settlement statement, prepared for the closing, indicated Neponset 
Valley as the seller, however, Leahy signed it personally on the seller's line. /d. 
13 /d. at 691, 493 N .E.2d at 487. The clause provided: 
/d. 
The acceptance of a deed by the Buyer or his nominee as the case may be, shall be 
deemed to be a full performance and discharge of every agreement and obligation 
herein contained or expressed except such as are, by the terms hereof, to be 
performed after delivery of said deed. 
14 /d. at 690, 493 N.E.2d at 486. 
15 /d. at 691, 493 N.E.2d at 487. The cost of $11,401 was derived from the expenses of 
employing carpenters, plumbers, electricians, and workmen to place the house in a con-
dition as contemplated by the parties. Complaint at 7, Pedersen v. Leahy, 397 Mass. 689, 
493 N.E.2d 486 (1986). 
16 Pedersen, 397 Mass. at 690, 493 N.E.2d at 486. 
17 /d. at 692, 493 N.E.2d at 488. 
18 /d. at 689, 493 N.E.2d at 486. 
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The Court first addressed the individual liability of Leahy on the pur-
chase and sale agreement. The Court noted that Leahy executed the 
purchase and sale agreement with his name followed by "DBA Neponset 
Valley Builders."19 The Court concluded that this form of signature at-
tached personal liability to Leahy because he signed the contract without 
any limitation, and because he named the corporation "as a trade name 
under which [he], an individual, did business."20 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied upon Southern Ins. Co. 
v. Consumer Ins. Agency Inc., 21 in which the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Louisiana held that under Texas law,22 when 
the phrase "doing business as" follows an individual's name, the individ-
ual is "personally liable for the torts and contracts of the business. "23 
The Supreme Judicial Court in Pedersen, also relied on the reasoning 
used by the Court of Appeal of Louisiana in McKendall v. Williams. 24 In 
McKendall, an officer of a corporation obtained a personal bank loan, 
the record of which indicated it was a d/b/a loan. 25 The Court of Appeal 
of Louisiana held that absent an express indication on the record that a 
corporate signatory was acting in an official capacity, the presence of d/ 
b/a would not bind the corporation. 26 
Relying upon these two cases, the Pedersen Court ruled that a d/b/a 
corporate signature bound Leahy in his individual capacity. The Court 
went on to note that the issue of whether one acted in the capacity of an 
agent is normally reduced to a question of factY Here, however, the 
19 /d. at 691, 493 N.E.2d at 487. 
20 /d. (quoting Southern Ins. Co. v. Consumer Ins. Agency, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 30, 32 
(E.D. La. 1977)). 
21 442 F. Supp. at 30. In Southern Insurance, the defendant, Moore, had entered into an 
insurance agency agreement for the sale of the plaintiff's, Southern's, policies in the state 
of Louisiana. Southern Ins., 442 F. Supp. at 30. The agency agreement stated that it was 
"between W.C. Moore d/b/a Consumer Insurance Agency Inc. of New Orleans ... and 
Southern Insurance Co." /d. at 31. W.C. Moore personally signed the agreement without 
qualifying his signature in any way. /d. In an action to collect premiums owed to it, Southern 
filed suit against W.C. Moore individually. /d. at 30. 
22 Texas law was applied because the agreement provided that the contract was to be 
construed under Texas law. /d. at 31. 
23 !d. The district court reasoned that such a phrase indicated that the individual whose 
name follows is the owner of the business. /d. In reaching its conclusion, the Southern Ins. 
court noted that "doing business as" does not create an entity distinct from the individual. 
442 F. Supp. at 31-32 (quoting Duval v. Midwest. Auto City, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 1381, 1387 
(D. Neb. 1977)). According to Southern Ins., the person acting as a sole proprietor, under 
one or several names remains one person, and is personally liable for his obligation. !d. 
(quoting Duval, 425 F. Supp. at 1387). Accordingly, the district court held Moore individ-
ually liable under the agreement. /d. at 32. 
24 467 So. 2d 1301 (La. Ct. App. 1985). 
25 McKendal/, 467 So. 2d at 1303. 
26Jd. 
27 Pedersen, 397 Mass. at 691, 493 N.E.2d at 487 (citing Stern v. Lieberman, 307 Mass. 
77, 81, 29 N.E.2d 839, 842 (1940)). 
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sufficient evidence allowed the Court to determine Leahy had not signed 
in the capacity of an agent. 28 The Court also found support for its decision 
in William Gilligan Co. v. Casey, where the Supreme Judicial Court ruled 
that a corporation or person may be known under different names, and 
that contracts entered into under such names are equally binding on the 
individual or corporation. 29 Thus, based upon the Court's interpretation 
of a d/b/a signature and the Court's acceptance of a corporation's or an 
individual's ability to contract under more than one name, the Court 
found Leahy personally liable on the purchase and sale agreement. 
After resolving the issue of personal liability, the Pedersen Court ad-
dressed whether an "acceptance of deed" provision foreclosed the plain-
tiffs from bringing an action based upon the construction duties of the 
seller. Generally, acceptance of a deed discharges the contractual duties 
of the seller. 30 The Court ruled that under the circumstances of this case, 
however, the "acceptance of deed" clause did not bar the action. 31 The 
Court examined two earlier Massachusetts cases, McMahon v. M & D 
Builders, Inc. 32 and Pybus v. Grasso33 in making this determination. 
The Pedersen Court began its analysis by noting that courts have 
interpreted the "acceptance of deed" clause as discharging the seller's 
obligations in matters concerning title but not to problems concerning 
home construction. 34 On this point the Court relied on its ruling in 
McMahon, 35 which provided that an acceptance of deed clause applied 
only to the real estate conveyed.36 The McMahon Court reasoned that 
28 /d. (citing Bissonette v. Keyes, 319 Mass. 134, 136, 64 N.E.2d 926, 927 (1946)). 
29 William Gilligan Co. v. Casey, 205 Mass. 26, 31, 91 N.E. 124, 124-25 (1910). 
30 M. PARK & D. PARK, REAL ESTATE LAW, vol. 28A MASS. PRACTICE SERIES§ 963 (2d 
ed. 1981). This general rule is often called the doctrine of merger. McMahon v. M & D 
Builders, Inc., 360 Mass. 54, 59, 271 N.E.2d 649, 652 (1971). The merger doctrine expresses 
the idea that the provisions of the purchase and sale agreement are merged into the deed, 
and upon acceptance of the deed all contractual duties of the seller are discharged. 
31 See Pedersen, 397 Mass. at 691-92, 493 N.E.2d at 487. 
32 360 Mass. 54, 271 N.E.2d 649 (1971). 
33 317 Mass. 716, 59 N.E.2d 289 (1945). 
34 See Pedersen, 397 Mass at 691, 493 N.E.2d at 487. 
3
' /d. (citing McMahon, 360 Mass. at 59-60, 271 N.E.2d at 653). 
36 McMahon, 360 Mass. at 60, 271 N.E.2d at 653. In McMahon, the plaintiffhomebuyers 
sought to rescind their purchase of a house and lot, on the basis of false and fraudulent 
representations and breach of implied warranties by the seller. /d. at 55, 271 N.E.2d at 
650. In the contract between the buyer and seller, there was a deed of acceptance clause 
which provided: . 
If the seller shall be unable to give title or to make conveyance as above stipulated, 
any payments made under this agreement shall be refunded, and all other obligations 
of either party hereunto shall cease. The acceptance of a deed by the Buyer shall 
be deemed to be a full performance and discharge hereof (emphasis supplied). 
/d. at 59, 271 N.E.2d at 652. The plaintiffs in McMahon, argued that such a clause was 
not a bar to relief. /d. 
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the general rule, discharging contractual duties, only precluded the buyer 
from raising a claim regarding the title conveyanceY In construing the 
clause involved in Pedersen, which was similar to that in McMahon, 38 
the Pedersen Court relied on McMahon to find that such an acceptance 
of deed clause was inapplicable to disputes over matters concerning the 
construction of a house. 39 
The Pedersen Court further supported its ruling by stating an exception 
to the general rule that acceptance of the deed discharged all duties of 
the seller. It noted that promises in addition to the title delivery - and 
which do not conflict with the deed - are an exception to the general 
rule. 40 This proposition is derived from the 1945 Supreme Judicial Court 
decision of Pybus v. Grasso.41 Relying on the exception announced in 
Pybus, the Pedersen Court held that Leahy's promised additional work 
was collateral to the delivery of the title and, therefore, beyond the scope 
of the "acceptance of deed" clause. 
Having concluded that the "acceptance of deed" clause did not fore-
close the plaintiffs' action, the Pedersen Court considered whether the 
defendant's liability was limited to the $750 placed in escrow. The Court 
ruled that the money placed in escrow pending the completion of work 
on the house was not a liquidated damages clause. Damages, therefore, 
were not limited to the $750 placed in escrow. 42 The Court reasoned that 
37 McMahon, 360 Mass. at 60, 271 N.E.2d at 653. The Court stated that such a clause 
was "applicable only to the title to the real estate which was to be conveyed, and that the 
plaintiffs' acceptance of the deed operated as a merger or waiver only to the extent of 
precluding any claim that the title which the defendant conveyed did not satisfy the 
requirements of the agreement." ld. 
38 See supra note 13 for the wording of the acceptance of deed clause. 
39 See Pedersen, 397 Mass. at 691, 493 N.E.2d at 487. 
40 Jd. at 691-92, 493 N.E.2d at 487. 
41 317 Mass. at 716, 59 N.E.2d at 287. In Pybus, the Court, in dicta, noted an exception 
to the general rule, that acceptance of the deed discharges the contractual duties of the 
seller. The exception provided that collateral or additional promises to the main promise 
of conveyance, which are not inconsistent with the deed, may be enforced after the deed 
is accepted. Pybus, 317 Mass. at 719, 59 N.E.2d at 291. In Pybus, the plaintiff contracted 
for a parcel of land with a building situated on it. Jd. at 716,59 N.E.2d at 290. The defendant 
delivered a quitclaim deed of "lot numbered 37." ld. at 717, 59 N.E.2d at 290. A survey 
later determined that part of the building contracted for was on adjoining lot 39, not owned 
by the defendant. /d. The Pybus Court held that the plaintiff had no remedy on breach of 
the contract by the defendant. /d. at 717, 59 N.E.2d at 291. The Pybus Court further ruled 
that the exception to the merger doctrine was inapplicable to the facts of that case because 
holding the defendant liable would be inconsistent with the deed, which described only lot 
37. ld. at 719, 59 N.E.2d at 292. 
42 Pedersen, 397 Mass. at 692, 493 N .E.2d at 487-88. The Court stated the agreed facts 
surrounding the escrow agreement: "'At the time of the closing ... , the promises which 
are the subject of this action were not completed and an amount of $750.00 was agreed 
upon to be held back, in escrow, with Robert Wilson, Esquire, buyers' attorney, pending 
completion of the work."' I d. at 692, 493 N.E.2d at 487. 
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because the escrow agreement did not indicate a ceiling on the defen-
dant's liability, the defendant's argument that the escrowed money acted 
as a liquidated damages clause failed. 43 Accordingly, because the Court 
found the defendant personally liable on the d/b/a signature, and because 
liability w,as not limited to the amount placed in escrow, the Supreme 
Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's award of damages in the amount 
of $10,651.44 
The Pedersen case has important implications on contracts and agency 
law in Massachusetts. Jt is the first case in this jurisdiction to establish 
that because a personal signature followed by d/b/a is not a proper agency 
signature it can be binding on the individual. 45 The case also serves to 
clarify earlier case law in deciding that an "acceptance of deed" clause 
is not applicable to construction problems arising separately from title 
matters. 46 Finally, the Pedersen Court further clarified prior case law by 
ruling that an escrow agreement, with no indication that it was meant as 
a liquidated damages clause, does not operate as a limit on the seller's 
liability .47 
The Supreme Judicial Court's finding Leahy personally liable on the 
d/b/a signature comports with established notions of agency law and 
corporate signatures. The corporate signature is intended to do two 
things: place responsibility oo the principal and avoid personal liability 
of the agent. 48 The standard corporate signature achieves both of these 
goals. It designates the corporate entity as the signatory party and indi-
cates the actual person signing does so in an agency capacity.49 It is clear 
from the signature in the Pedersen case that the document did not indicate 
the corporate entity as the signatory party, nor Leahy's capacity as an 
agent of the corporation. 
Furthermore, the Court recognized the ability of a corporation or an 
indi\'idual to contract under more than one name. 5° As a result, Leahy's 
personal liability reflects the notion that a party can contract under more 
than one name. Leahy's signature on the purchase and sale agreement 
43 !d. at 692, 493 N.E.2d at 487-88. 
44 /d. at 692, 493 N.E.2d at 488. 
45 See supra notes 19-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of d/b/a signatures. 
46 See supra notes 30-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of "acceptance of deed" 
clauses. 
47 See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of escrow arrangements. 
48 PEAIRS, supra note 3, at § 487. 
49 /d. A standard corporate signature would be: 
"X Corporation 
by ___ _ 
A.B., Treasurer" 
/d. 
50 Gilligan Co., 205 Mass. at 31, 91 N.E. at 124-25. 
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indicated that he did business under the name of Neponset Valley Build-
ers Inc., and thus, the Supreme Judicial Court's decision consistently 
applied general notions of agency and contract law. 
In adopting a rule which creates personal liability for d/b/a signatures, 
the Court emphasized the importance of adhering to the requirements of 
an agency signature. The Pedersen Court's holding clearly indicates that 
a signature which gives the impression of being signed in a personal 
capacity, and which does not follow the general requirements of a cor-
porate signature may attach personal liability. Accordingly, practitioners 
should not use d/b/a signatures when the intent is to bind the corporate 
entity and to free the individual agent of any personal liability. If the 
individual intends to sign as an agent of the corporation, he or she should 
employ the usual corporate signature, which designates the corporation 
as the signatory party, and indicates the agency capacity of the individual 
signing. 
The Pedersen decision is also important because it clarifies the impli-
cations of "acceptance of deed" clauses with respect to home buyers. 
The Pedersen Court elaborated upon the exception to the merger doctrine 
enunciated in Pybus, that promises which are additional or collateral to 
the conveyance of land are not necessarily merged into the deed. 51 The 
Court found that the seller's duty to complete work on the Pedersen 
house survived even after the buyer had accepted the deed.SZ This deci-
sion indicates, ~t least with regard to the sale of houses, that the Court 
views final construc,tion work and finishing touches as "additional or 
collateral" to the title conveyance. The Court's position protects consum-
ers by ensuring that vendors complete the house in a promised or war-
ranted condition. This ruling implies that closing does not relieve builders 
of their construction obligations. Rather, the duty may continue beyond 
acceptance of the deed. 
Finally, the Pedersen Court found that the $750 placed in escrow did 
not act to liquidate damages. 53 The Court held that the escrow arrange-
ment did not sufficiently indicate intent to make the agreement a liqui-
dated damages clause. 54 The Court's decision implies that escrow agree-
ments are not per se liquidated damages clauses. Rather, the parties must 
explicitly demonstrate that they intended the escrow agreement to func-
tion as a liquidated damages clause. The Pedersen case indicates the 
Court's unwillingness to infer such an intention unless explicitly dem-
onstrated. Thus, parties intending to make an escrow arrangement into 
51 Pybus, 317 Mass. at 719, 59 N .E.2d at 291. 
52 See Pedersen, 397 Mass. at 691-92, 493 N.E.2d at 487. See supra notes 30-41 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of the merger doctrine and its exception. 
"Id. at 692, 493.N.E.2d at 487-88. 
54 ld. 
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a liability cap or liquidated damages clause should state so clearly in the 
escrow agreement. 
The Pedersen case is an important decision in Massachusetts' agency 
and contract law. It determined for the first time that use of d/b/a in 
corporate signatures could impose personal liability. The case also clar-
ified the exception to the merger doctrine, and thereby established that 
a duty to do construction work on a house survives the buyer's accep-
tance of the deed. Finally, the case illustrates the Court's unwillingness 
to infer a limit on liability or a liquidated damages clause from an escrow 
arrangement when the requisite intent is lacking. 
§ 1.2. Incorporation of a General Contract's terms in a Subcontract.* 
Since 1911, the Massachusetts courts have held fast to the view that the 
terms of a general contract will only be incorporated in a subcontract by 
appropriate language in the subcontract referring to the general contract. 1 
The general contract cannot be read into a subcontract by implication. 2 
From 1911 to the present, the Massachusetts courts have repeatedly 
considered and upheld this rule. 3 During the Survey year, in Chicopee 
Concrete Serv. v. Hart Engineering, the Supreme Judicial Court reaf-
firmed this rule. 4 The Court, however, added to the law in this area by 
addressing two other issues.5 
In Chicopee, the defendant, general contractor, Hart Engineering 
(Hart), submitted a bid for a contract to construct a waste water treatment 
plant to the city of Holyoke.6 Hart, in preparing its bid for the general 
contract, requested a subcontract bid for the sale of cement from Chi-
copee Concrete Service (Chicopee).7 Chicopee quoted its prices by letter 
to Hart, which used these prices in calculating its bid for the general 
contract.8 
*Joseph A. DiBrigida Jr., staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 1.2. 1 Soley & Sons v. Jones, 208 Mass. 561, 566-67, 95 N.E. 94, 94 (1911). 
2 ld. 
3 See Farm-Rite Implement v. Fenestra, Inc., 340 Mass. 276, 281, 163 N.E.2d 285, 289-
90 (1960), rev'd, 342 Mass. 427, 431, 173 N.E.2d 636, 639 (1%1); Vappi & Co. v. Sullivan, 
331 Mass. 463, 466-67, 120 N.E.2d 203, 205 (1954). 
4 398 Mass. 476, 478, 498 N.E.2d 121, 122 (1986). 
5 In Chicopee, the Court also held that in the absence of a statute rejecting incorporation 
by general reference, incorporation by a clearly stated general reference is sufficient. Jd. 
In dicta, the Court further stated that if Chicopee knew or had notice of the clause which 
Hart sought to incorporate, Chicopee might have been bound by that clause. Id. at 478-
79, 498 N.E.2d at 122. 
• 20 Mass. App. Ct. 315, 315, 479 N.E.2d 748, 748 (1985). 
7 ld. at 316, 479 N.E.2d at 748. 
8 Id. 
8
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Hart, by letter, confirmed its intention to award Chicopee the subcon-
tract for concrete9 but conditioned the award of the subcontract upon 
receipt of a formal general contract from the city. 10 Hart's letter directed 
Chicopee's attention to the "Contract & General Conditions, Supple-
mentary General Conditions, Special Conditions, Information for Bid-
ders, and the Technical Specifications" sections of the general contract 
to be awarded by the city. 11 The letter stated that these sections would 
be made part of Chicopee's subcontract, and also specifically cautioned 
Chicopee to comply with all requirements of "Nondiscrimination in Em-
ployment and the President's Executive Order 11246."12 
The city awarded Hart the general contract. 13 The general conditions 
of the contract to be awarded by the city contained an owner-approval 
clause providing that no subcontracts could be awarded unless approved 
by the city's engineering firm, Tighe & Bond/SCI (Tighe)Y Hart then 
sent to Chicopee its subcontract which ·stated that Chicopee was to 
furnish all materials and equipment according to the specifications, terms 
and conditions of the city's engineering firm, TigheY Chicopee signed 
9 One of the issues not appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court was whether a contract 
existed between Chicopee and Hart. /d. at 317-19, 479 N.E.2d at 749-50. The Appeals 
Court concluded that Hart's purchase order to Chicopee constituted a valid contract. /d. 
at 318, 479 N.E.2d at 750. Because the Hart-Chicopee contract was the subcontract, 
"purchase order" and "subcontract" will be used synonymously throughout this chapter. 
10 /d. at 316, 479 N.E.2d at 748-49. Chicopee expanded its facilities and purchased new 
equipment in anticipation of the purchase order. /d. at 317, 479 N.E.2d at 749. 
11 /d. at 316, 479 N.E.2d at 749. 
12 /d. The Appeals Court had found support for its holding in the fact that the part of the 
general contract that was not particular to the work Chicopee was to perform was incor-
porated in the purchase order by specific reference: "You are specifically cautioned to fully 
comply with all the requirements pertaining to Nondiscrimination in Employment and the 
President's Executive Order 11246 and amendments." 20 Mass. App. Ct. at 321, 479 N .E.2d 
at 751. The Court found that specific reference to these requirements did not support the 
Appeals Court's conclusion because under 29 C.F.R. § 5.5(a)(6) (1986) these requirements 
cannot be incorporated by reference to contract documents. 398 Mass. at 478 n.1, 498 
N.E.2d at 122 n.l. 
13 /d. at 317, 479 N.E.2d at 749. 
14 /d. at 315-16, 479 N.E.2d at 748. Such a clause is referred to as an "owner-approval" 
clause because the owner of the project and land, the city, retains the power to approve 
or disapprove any proposed subcontractors. In this case, the city authorized its engineering 
firm to exercise this power. 
"/d. at 317, 479 N .E.2d at 749. The pertinent part of the subcontract stated that Chicopee 
was to: "Furnish all materials and equipment to perform the 'SCOPE OF WORK' hereto 
attached in strict accerdance with plans and specifications entitled 'Holyoke Wastewater 
Treatment Plant Improvements' ... as prepared by Tighe & Bond/SCI, including all 
drawings listed therein ... General Terms & Conditions, codes, and other publications 
referred to therein." /d. 
9
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the subcontract. 16 After the engineering firm rejected Chicopee, 17 Hart 
withdrew the subcontract. 18 
Chicopee brought an action for breach of the subcontract against 
Hart. 19 The superior court judge found that the contract between Chi-
copee and Hart was subject to the approval of the city's engineering firm, 
Tighe. 20 The court therefore held that Hart's withdrawal of the subcon-
tract, prompted by the engineering firm's disapproval of the subcontract 
with Chicopee, was not a breach of the subcontract.21 The Appeal's Court 
reversed, finding that the owner-approval clause of the general contract 
was not incorporated in the Hart-Chicopee subcontract. 22 The Supreme 
Judicial Court upheld the Appeals Court decision reversing the superior 
court judgment. 23 
On the appeal of Chicopee from the intermediate court, the Supreme 
Judicial Court, in a brief opinion, upheld the reasoning and holding of 
the Appeals Court. 24 Whether Hart's withdrawal of its subcontract to 
Chicopee constituted a breach of the Hart-Chicopee subcontract rested 
on whether the subcontract incorporated the owner-approval clause of 
the general contract. 25 In the Appeals Court, Hart contended that three 
specific clauses of the general contract required that subcontracts be 
approved by the city's engineering firm and that these clauses were 
incorporated into the subcontract by reference in the subcontract. 26 First, 
Hart pointed to paragraph G of the "Proposal Form for Sub Bid" which 
provided that the subcontractor agree to be bound to the general con-
tractor by the general conditions of the plans and specifications and to 
assume toward the general contractor all the obligations and responsibil-
ities owed to the owner.27 Hart further directed the court's attention to 
article 58 of the "General Requirements" and paragraph HH of the "Spe-
cial Provisions" which provided that the general contractor may not 
subcontract any work without the owner's prior written approval.28 
The Appeals Court rejected Hart's contention, holding that only by 
16 ld. 
17 Id. 
18 ld. 
19 Id. at 316, 479 N.E.2d at 748. 
20 ld. 
21 ld. 
22 ld. 
23 398 Mass. at 479, 498 N.E.2d at 123. 
24 Id. at 477, 498 N.E.2d at 122. 
25 20 Mass. App. Ct. at 319, 479 N.E.2d at 750. 
26 Id. at 319-20 n.5, 479 N.E.2d at 750 n.5. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
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unambiguous and appropriate language in the subcontract could the 
owner-approval clause or the general contract in its entirety be incor-
porated. 29 Relying on the Supreme Judicial Court's decisions in Vappi & 
Co. v. Sullivan, 30 and Soley & Sons v. Jones, 31 the Appeals Court found 
that in the absence of such reference, only terms relating to the work to 
be done are impliedly incorporated into the subcontract by general ref-
erence.32 Notwithstanding the reference in the subcontract to the "Gen-
eral Terms & Conditions," and hence article 58 of the "General Require-
ments" and paragraph HH of the "Special Provisions," the court did not 
29 /d. at 320, 479 N .E.2d at 750-51. 
30 331 Mass. 463, 120 N.E.2d 203 (1954). 
In Vappi, the plaintiff, general contractor (Vappi) entered into a general contract with a 
landowner to build a shopping center. /d. at 463, 120 N.E.2d at 203. The general contract 
contained several provisions requiring the contractor to protect the property from damage 
during the course of the work and to pay for damages in certain instances. !d. at 464, 120 
N.E.2d at 203-04. Vappi then contracted with the defendant, subcontractor (Sullivan), for 
work to be done according to the architect's plans and specifications as stated in the general 
contract. /d. at 464-65, 120 N.E.2d at 204. 
During the course of its work, Sullivan caused damage to the property. !d. at 465, 120 
N.E.2d at 204. When Vappi notified Sullivan that it was Sullivan's responsibility to pay for 
the property damage, Sullivan refused. /d. Vappi made the repairs at its own expense and 
brought suit to recover the cost of those repairs from Sullivan. /d. at 465-66, 120 N.E.2d 
at 204. The Court held that when a subcontractor contracts to do work according to the 
plans and specifications of the general contract, these plans and specifications are read into 
the subcontract by implication. /d. at 466-67, 120 N.E.2d at 205. The subcontractor, 
therefore, steps into the shoes of the general contractor and assumes the general contrac-
tor's obligations with respect to that particular part of the work to be performed. /d. at 
466-67, 120 N.E.2d at 205. 
3
' 208 Mass. 561, 95 N.E. 94 (1911). In Soley, the defendant, general contractor (Jones), 
entered into a contract with the city of Boston for the construction of a tunnel. 208 Mass. 
at 562, 95 N.E. at 94. This general contract contained a provision allowing the city to 
cancel the contract if the city's engineer determined that the contractor was not making 
such progress that the work would be completed on time. !d. at 566, 95 N.E. at 94. Jones 
then contracted with the plaintiff, subcontractor (Soley), to perform work in a careful and 
workmanlike manner and according to the orders of the Boston Transit Commission. /d. 
at 563, 95 N.E. at 94. When the commission terminated the city's contract with Jones, 
Soley ceased working and brought suit against Jones for the contract price. !d. at 562-63, 
95 N.E. at 94. 
Jones contended that when construed in connection with the circumstances, a condition 
that the subcontract was dependent upon the continued existence of the general contract 
could be implied or was an unexpressed term of the subcontract. /d. at 566, 95 N .E. at 94. 
In rejecting Jones' contention, the Court held that the general contract in its entirety would 
have been incorporated into the subcontract if the general contract had been referred to 
by appropriate language. /d. Where only that part of the general contract pertinent to the 
subcontractor's performance may be implied and the language is clear, the general contract 
may not be read into the subcontract by implication. !d. at 566-67, 95 N.E. at 94. 
32 20 Mass. App. Ct. at 320, 479 N.E.2d at 750-51. 
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find the required cross-reference to relevant documents needed to incor-
porate anything other than the terms of the general contract that were 
relevant to the work to be performed by Chicopee.33 
Citing with approval to the Appeals Court opinion, the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court found that the terms of the general contract were not incor-
porated in the subcontract by the language in the subcontract. 34 The 
Court held that the subcontract incorporated by general reference only 
those terms of the general contract that referred to the work Chicopee 
was to perform.35 The Court, therefore, affirmed the Appeals Court de-
cision.36 To this extent, the Court's decision agreed with prior law in this 
areaY 
The Supreme Judicial Court did, however, consider and decide two 
issues which added to the prior law. 38 First, although the Court agreed 
with the Appeals Court that the terms of a general contract could be fully 
incorporated into the subcontract by appropriate reference, the Court 
refused to adopt the interpretation urged by the amicus curiae. 39 The 
Associated General Contractors of Massachusetts, in an amicus brief, 
argued that the Appeals Court opinion should be interpreted as announc-
ing a rule that a provision of a general contract can be included in a 
subcontract only if specifically referred to as a condition of the subcon-
33 /d. at 320, 479 N.E.2d at 751. 
In so finding, the Appeals Court in Chicopee relied on a Connecticut decision, Raff Co. 
v. Murphy, 110 Conn. 234, 147 A. 709 (1929). In Raff, the plaintiff, general contractor 
(Raff), requested a bid from the defendant, subcontractor (Murphy), for plumbing work. 
/d. at 236-37, 147 A. at 710. Murphy submitted the bid. /d. at 237, 147 A. at 710. Raff 
incorporated this bid in the bid it submitted on the general contract. /d. at 237, 147 A. at 
710-11. 
Raff advised Murphy that it would notify Murphy upon receipt of formal notice of the 
award of the contract. /d. at 237, 147 A. at 711. Two days later, Murphy informed Raff 
that because of an error it had made in calculating its bid, Murphy could not go through 
with the contract. /d. Raff was then awarded the general contract, which contained a 
provision requiring the contractor to obtain the written consent of the state's engineers 
before subcontracting any work. /d. at 238, 147 A. at 711. Raff never obtained such 
permission. /d. at 238-39, 147 A. at 711. Murphy did not perform the contract and Raff 
had to pay a second subcontractor $4200 more for the work than Murphy's bid. /d. at 238, 
147 A. at 711. Raff brought an action against Murphy to recover damages for breach of 
contract. /d. at 235, 147 A. at 710. The Connecticut Supreme Court found that the provision 
in the general contract requiring the consent of the state's engineers to the subcontract was 
not made an express condition of the subcontract./d. at 240, 147 A. at 711-12. Furthermore, 
it found no facts which would incorporate the general contract provision in the subcontract 
by implication. /d. at 240, 147 A. at 712. 
34 /d. at 477-78, 498 N.E.2d at 122. 
35 /d. at 478, 498 N .E.2d at 122. 
36 /d. at 479, 498 N.E.2d at 123. 
37 See supra notes 30, 31, 33 and accompanying text. 
38 398 Mass. at 478-79, 498 N.E.2d at 122-23. 
39 /d. at 478, 498 N.E.2d at 122. 
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tract. 40 The Court rejected this argument, holding that unless some statute 
rejects incorporation by general reference, incorporation by a clearly 
stated general reference is sufficient.41 The Court thus explicitly validated 
incorporation by general reference.42 
Second, the Court, finding no genuine issue as to any material fact, 
upheld the Appeals Court order of summary judgment to Chicopee on 
the question of Hart's liability. 43 In so doing, the Court held that if the 
superior court had granted Chicopee's motion for summary judgment 
based on the material before that court, the Appeals Court was fully 
warranted in ordering summary judgment when faced with the same 
record.44 Such a finding did not change prior law.45 The Court added to 
prior law, however, when it stated in dicta that if Chicope~ knew or had 
notice of the owner-approval clause, Hart might survive Chicopee's sum-
mary judgment motion. 46 In such a situation, Chicopee might be bound 
by the clause despite the fact that the clause was not incorporated by 
referenceY Hart did not make such an argument in the trial court. 48 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Judicial Court stated that if Chicopee did 
have knowledge or notice of the owner-approval clause, the Court would 
consider such an argument, even though Hart did not raise and the 
superior court judge did not deal with the issue. 49 Finding that the record 
did not support such an argument, the Court upheld the summary judg-
ment award.50 
Thus, under the current state of Massachusetts law, a provision of a 
general contract will be included in a subcontract even if not specifically 
referred to in the subcontract. If the general contract is to be incorporated 
by general reference, however, the reference must be "clearly stated." 
As the Court has shown, it considers this standard to be very high, and 
will strictly construe the language of the contracts. The reference to 
either the general contract in its entirety or to the particular provision of 
the general contract sought to be incorporated in the subcontract must 
be unambiguous. Furthermore, the language must refer to more than just 
the terms of the general contract that are pertinent to the work to be 
performed by the subcontractor for the general contractor. Moreover, 
40 Id. at 477-78, 498 N.E.2d at 121-22. 
41 Id. at 478, 498 N.E.2d at 122. 
42 Id. 
43 ld. 
44 Id. 
45 See 6 J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE~ 56.27(2] 
(2d ed. 1985). 
46 398 Mass. at 478-79, 498 N.E.2d at 122. 
47 ld. 
48 Id. at 478, 498 N.E.2d at 122. 
49 Jd. at 479, 498 N.E.2d at 122. 
sold. 
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even if the portion of the general contract sought to be incorporated into 
the subcontract is not incorporated, the general contractor may survive 
a motion for summary judgment by presenting evidence establishing that 
the subcontractor had knowledge or notice of the clause in question. 
The standard upheld by the Court in Chicopee is appropriate because 
it encourages precise and careful drafting of contracts. Because it pro-
motes precise drafting, the standard benefits all parties concerned. The 
general contractor and subcontractor will know the exact terms of their 
respective contracts and will not resort to litigation as a means of contract 
interpretation. Such a standard will, therefore, also benefit the judicial 
system by eliminating litigation that could have been avoided through 
careful draftsmanship. The result will be an easing of the burden on the 
courts. 
The standard followed by the Court in Chicopee therefore carries 
important drafting caveats for the practioner. Wherever possible, sub-
contracts should be drafted with specific reference to the provisions of 
the general contract sought to be incorporated. If the desire is to incor-
porate the entire general contract, it may be accomplished by general 
reference so long as the language is unambiguous. Furthermore, any 
reference to the general contract should refer to more than the work to 
be done by the subcontractor for the general contractor or the attempt 
at incorporation will fail. If the reference relates back to portions of the 
general contract dealing with the general contractor's obligations to the 
owner, or to specific owner-approval clauses, the incorporation attempt 
stands a better chance. 
In conclusion, courts in Massachusetts have historically applied a high 
standard when judging whether the terms of a general contract have been 
incorporated by reference into a subcontract. Furthermore, the courts 
have strictly construed the language of such contracts. The Supreme 
Judicial Court's decision in Chicopee indicates that the Court intends to 
continue to apply this high standard. The Court's refusal to lower its 
traditionally high standards for judging incorporation creates an incentive 
for counsel to draft subcontracts carefully and unambiguously to ensure 
that the provisions of the general contract sought to be incorporated in 
the subcontract will be construed by the courts as incorporated. 
§ 1.3. Vicarious Liability for Multiple Damages Under Chapter 93A. * 
Massachusetts courts have applied the Consumer Protection Act1 in a 
wide variety of business and trade contexts2 to remedy unfair or deceptive 
*James P. Hawkins, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 1.3. 1 G.L. c. 93A (1984 ed.). 
2 See, e.g., Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 396 Mass. 760,489 N.E.2d 
185 (1986) (promotor of data communications trade show recovered for misrepresentations 
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trade practices. 3 Section II of the Act provides for private actions and 
allows the court to award multiple damages to victims of wilful or know-
ing violations.4 While businesses or corporations often have been charged 
with such intentional violations,5 the courts have never considered a 
company's liability for multiple damages where the unfair or deceptive 
dealing with the victim was negligent, but induced by an employee's 
wilful misconduct. 
The alleged victim of an unfair or deceptive trade practice must prove 
three elements to recover multiple damages under the Act.6 First, he or 
she must establish that the conduct in question constitutes an unfair or 
deceptive trade practice. 7 Second, he or she must prove that the violation 
by competing promotor regarding the latter's possession of magazine circulation list and 
use of litigation as a marketing weapon against the recovering promotor); Service Publi-
cations, Inc. v. Goverman, 396 Mass. 567, 487 N.E.2d 520 (1986) (purchaser of magazine 
subscription business recovered for seller's misrepresentations and information withhold-
ings in negotiating the sale); Linthicum v. Archimbault, 379 Mass. 381, 398 N.E.2d 482 
(1979) (owner of residential rental property recovered for breach of warranty by roofing 
contractor); Wasserman v. Agnastopolous, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 672, 497 N .E.2d 19 (1986) 
(lessee, who operated a restaurant on the leased premises recovered damages against lessor 
for conduct which resulted in termination of agreement to sell business to third party). See 
also Lantner v. Carson, 374 Mass. 606, 610-12, 373 N.E.2d 973, 976-77 (1978), for a 
discussion of the factors in determining whether a private individual's isolated transaction 
falls within the "business context" under § II of the Act. The relevant circumstances 
include the nature of the transaction and the character of the parties involved. !d. at 610, 
373 N.E.2d at 976. 
3 G.L. c. 93A, § 2(a) defines the scope of the chapter by stating, "[u]nfair methods of 
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or 
commerce are hereby declared unlawful." 
4 G.L. c. 93A, § II (1984 ed.) reads, in relevant part: 
Any person who engages in the conduct of any trade or commerce and who suffers 
any loss of money or property ... as a result of the use or employment by another 
person who engages in any trade or commerce of an unfair method of competition 
or an unfair or deceptive act or practice declared unlawful by section two ... may 
... bring an action ... for damages and such equitable relief ... as the court 
deems necessary and proper. . . . [M]oney damages . . . may include double or 
treble damages, attorneys' fees and costs. 
If the court finds for the petitioner, recovery shall be in the amount of actual 
damages; or up to three, but not less than two, times such amount if the court finds 
that the use or employment of the method of competition or the act or practice was 
a willful or knowing violation of said section two. 
5 See supra note 2 for cases in which the chapter 93A, § II plaintiff or couterclaimant 
alleged wilful or knowing violations of the Act and sought multiple damages. 
6 See Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. Business Incentives, Inc., 398 Mass. 854, 859, 501 
N.E.2d 1163, 1166 (1986). 
7 See PMP Associates, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 366 Mass. 593, 321 N.E.2d 915 
(1975). In PMP, the Supreme Judicial Court accepted the Federal Trade Commission's 
standards for determining whether a trade practice is unfair. /d. at 596, 321 N.E.2d at 917-
18. The FTC considerations which the Court adopted include whether the practice: (1) is 
15
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was wilful or knowing. 8 Finally, the victim needs to demonstrate actual 
damages which have resulted from the violative conduct.9 
Where the victim brings suit under the multiple damage provision 
against a business rather than an individual, and the violations have been 
committed by an employee of the business, the courts apply the doctrine 
of respondeat superior to determine the company's liability. 10 Under the 
respondeat superior doctrine, an employer is liable for the tortious con-
duct of its employee if performed within the scope of employment. 11 To 
fall within the scope of employment, the employee's conduct must be of 
the type he is employed to perform, 12 it must take place within the space 
and time limits which the employer has established, 13 and it must be at 
least partially intended to serve the employer's interests. 14 Applying the 
respondeat superior doctrine, the courts have found violations of the Act 
by business entities and have awarded multiple damages for an employ-
ee's wilful or knowing violations. 15 
The policy underlying chapter 93A is to encourage honest business 
practices and to protect consumers from unfair or deceptive dealings. 16 
within the penumbra of"common-law, statutory or other established concept of unfairness," 
(2) "is immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous;" and (3) "causes substantial injury 
to consumers (or competitors or other businessmen)." 29 Fed. Reg. 8325, 8355 (1964). The 
FTC regulations state that if each of the three factors is present and the conduct is 
"exploitive or inequitable" and "seriously detrimental" to consumers or others as well as 
"morally objectionable," the practice is unfair. /d. 
8 See Computer Systems Eng'g, Inc. v. Qantel Corp., 571 F. Supp. 1365, 1373-76 (D. 
Mass. 1983), aff' d, 740 F.2d 59 (1st Cir. 1984), for a thoughtful discussion of the "wilful or 
knowing violation" element. 
9 See Kohl v. Silver Lake Motors, Inc., 369 Mass. 795, 800-0l, 343 N.E.2d 375, 379 
(1976). The victim can only recover for losses which were a foreseeable consequence of 
the unfair practice. /d. at 801, 343 N.E.2d at 379. 
10 It is well recognized under principles of general corporate law that an employer will 
be held liable for the actions of an employee taken within the scope of employment. See 
PROSSER & KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS§ 70 (5th ed. 1984); 57 C.J.S. Master and Servant 
§ 555 (1948); see also Shaw v. Rodman Ford Truck Center, Inc., 19 Mass. App. Ct. 709, 
712, 477 N.E.2d 413, 415 (1985) (employer held liable for conduct of salesman and sales 
manager). 
11 57 C.J.S. Master and Servant§ 555 (1948). See Douglas v. Holyoke Machine Co., 233 
Mass. 573, 576, 124 N.E. 478, 479 (1919). 
12 See infra note 39. 
13 See infra note 40. 
14 See infra note 41. 
"Compare Shaw, 19 Mass. App. Ct. at 712, 477 N.E.2d at 415 (company held liable for 
double damages where defendant's salesman and sales manager found to have committed 
unfair trade practices in misrepresenting the condition of a used truck to the plaintiff-buyer) 
with Wasserman, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 672, 497 N.E.2d 19 (only single damages awarded 
under § ll where property owner unintentionally interfered with lessee's sale of business 
to prospective lessee). 
16 See Heller v. Silverbranch Constr. Corp., 376 Mass. 621, 624, 382 N.E.2d 1065, 1069 
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The multiple damage provisions penalize wilful violations more severely 
than negligent or unintentional violations, thereby detering unscrupulous 
practices. The availability as well as the amount of additional damages 
depends on the degree of the violator's culpabilityY Imputing multiple 
damage liability onto companies for their employees' intentional miscon-
duct promotes this policy by encouraging businesses to supervise and 
control their employees' practices. Without the threat of vicarious liabil-
ity, companies could remain ignorant of their employees' conduct, reap 
the profits of their work, yet disclaim liability for violative acts. 
During the Survey year, in Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. Business Incen-
tives, Inc., 18 the Supreme Judicial Court encountered a new problem in 
the application of agency principles to unfair trade practice cases. A 
unanimous Court found Wang liable for multiple damages under the Act 
where an employee's intentional conveyance of misinformation induced 
the company executives to violate the Act. 19 Wang did not appeal the 
lower court's determinations that its conduct constituted an unfair or 
deceptive trade practice or that its conduct had damaged the opposing 
party in the amount which the court awarded. However, because the 
executives' act was negligent rather than intentional, the company argued 
that it should only be liable for single damages. 20 Without knowing or 
intentional misconduct by the violator, the victim is entitled to recover 
only his actual damages.21 The Court applied the respondeat superior 
doctrine to the intent question, imputed the employee's bad faith to the 
company and held the company liable for multiple damages. 22 
The Wang case arose from the termination of a 1977 contract between 
Wang Laboratories, Inc. (Wang) and Business Incentives, Inc. (BI), un-
der which BI was to identify and obtain tax savings for Wang. 23 BI's 
compensation was to be one-third of the resultant tax savings. 24 The 
contract did not contain a termination clause and extended through 
(1978). Heller addressed a claim under chapter 93A, § 9, which protects consumers from 
unfair trade practices, involving a dissatisfied home buyer, but the same concerns underlie 
the so-called "businessman's" provisions in§ 11. See generally id. at 621, 382 N.E.2d at 
1065. See also Manning v. Zuckerman, 388 Mass. 8, 12, 444 N.E.2d 1262, 1264-65 (1983) 
(Court determined that disputes arising out of an employment relationship do not fall within 
the legislature's intended scope of c. 93A) and infra note 54. 
17 See Linthicum v. Archimbault, 379 Mass. 381, 388, 398 N.E.2d 482, 487 (1979). 
18 398 Mass. 854, 501 N.E.2d 1163 (1986). 
19 Id. 
20 See id. at 858, 501 N.E.2d at 1167. 
21 See Wasserman, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 680-81,497 N.E.2d at 24; Linthicum, 379 Mass. 
at 388, 398 N.E.2d at 487. 
22 Wang, 398 Mass. at 860-61,501 N.E.2d at 1167. 
23 Id. at 855, 501 N.E.2d at 1164. The original contract was between Wang and Dudley 
L. Post, who subsequently incorporated his business as Business Incentives, Inc. ld. 
24 ld. 
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1983.25 Prior to Wang's termination of the contract in 1981, BI allegedly 
performed the required services for the years 1977 through 1980.26 At the 
time that Wang terminated the contract, it allegedly owed BI $340,890.50 
for services rendered. 27 Wang executives terminated the BI contract at 
the recommendation of Wang's junior manager of in-house tax affairs, 
who criticized BI's performance under the contract and suggested that 
Wang could avoid BI's fees by having current staff assume the work. 28 
Wang initiated the suit in district court to recover for BI's alleged 
failure to utilize the tax savings program to Wang's full benefit and for 
violation of the Consumer Protection Act. 29 BI removed the case to 
superior court and counterclaimed for breach of contract, as well as 
multiple damages for alleged violation of the Act. 30 The superior court 
denied Wang's claims, and awarded single contract damages to BI on 
four of its seven counterclaims.31 The court held that Wang's junior 
manager of in-house tax affairs had wilfully interfered with BI's contrac-
tual relationship with Wang by erroneously and in bad faith reporting to 
his superiors that BI had failed to maximize Wang's tax savings.32 Relying 
on the junior manager's false and partially self-serving comments, Wang 
executives terminated the BI contract. 33 
Under the respondeat superior doctrine, the court held that the Wang 
executives' termination of the BI contract constituted an unfair trade 
practice under the Consumer Protection Act, for which the company was 
liable.J4 The judge characterized the executives' conduct as negligent 
rather than wilful, however, and ruled that multiple damages were there-
fore not available under the damages section of the Act. 35 
On direct appeal by Bl, the only issue before the Supreme Judicial 
Court was whether the manager's wilful misrepresentations could be 
imputed to the Wang executives who relied on them, thereby making 
multiple damages available to BJ.36 The Supreme Judicial Court overruled 
the superior court decision and held that Wang had intentionally violated 
25 /d. at 856, 501 N.E.2d at 1164. 
26 /d. at 855, 501 N.E.2d at 1164. 
27 See id. at 856-57, 501 N.E.2d at 1164-65. 
28 /d. at 857, 501 N.E.2d at 1165. 
29 /d. at 855, 501 N.E.2d at 1164. 
30 /d. 
31 /d. 
32 /d. at 857, 501 N.E.2d at 1165. 
33 /d. 
34 /d. at 857-58, 501 N.E.2d at 1165. 
35 /d. at 858, 501 N.E.2d at 1165. See supra note 4 for the pertinent text of G.L. c. 93A, 
§ 11 (1984 ed.). 
36 Wang, 398 Mass. at 859, 501 N.E.2d at 1166. 
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the Act and that multiple damages were therefore appropriate,37 The 
Court reasoned that the determinative factor was whether the manager's 
unfair acts were performed within the scope of his employment. 38 The 
Court enumerated three elements necessary to a finding of an employer's 
vicarious liability for the tortious conduct of its employees: the conduct 
must be of the kind the employee is engaged to perform, 39 it must occur 
substantially within the authorized time and space limits,40 and it must 
be motivated at least partially by a purpose to serve the employer.41 
Applying this vicarious liability test to the facts of the case, the Court 
first rejected Wang's argument that the manager's acting on his own 
initiative in reviewing BI's performance took the conduct outside of the 
scope of the manager's duties. 42 The Court determined that Wang exec-
utives repeatedly endorsed and relied upon the manager's appraisal of 
BI's work and involvement with the BI contract. 43 The Court thus con-
cluded that the manager's criticism of BI' s performance fell within the 
bounds of his employment.44 These facts, the Court found, also satisfied 
the requirement that the conduct occur within the authorized time and 
space limits. 45 
Applying the final test, motive to serve the employer, the Court noted 
that an employee's predominant motive of benefiting himself will not take 
the conduct outside the scope of employment if it is otherwise within his 
authority.46 The Court recognized, however, that the manager's intent to 
advance his own interests within the corporation might remove the con-
duct from the scope of employmentY As the trial judge had found, 
37 Id. at 860-61, 501 N.E.2d at 1167. 
38 ld. at 859,501 N.E.2d at 1166. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 228 (1958). 
39 Wang, 398 Mass. at 859, 501 N.E.2d at 1166 (citing Douglas v. Holyoke, 233 Mass. 
573, 576, 124 N.E. 478, 479 (1919)). 
40 Id. (citing Vallavanti v. Armour & Co., 260 Mass. 417, 419-20, 157 N.E. 527, 528 
(1927)). The Court appears to use "time and space limits" to refer to the hours and place 
of employment which the employer has established for the employee. See id. at 860, 501 
N.E.2d at 1167. 
41 Jd. at 859, 501 N.E.2d at 1166 (citing Donahue v. Vorenberg, 227 Mass. I, 5, 116 N.E. 
246, 247 (1917); McKeever v. Ratcliffe, 218 Mass. 17, 20, 105 N.E. 552, 552-53 (1914)). 
42 Jd. at 860, 501 N.E.2d at 1167. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Jd. 
46 /d. at 859-60, 501 N.E.2d at 1166-67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 236, 
comment b (1958). See also U.S. v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 241-42 (!st. Cir.), cert. denied, 
459 U.S. 991 (1982)(employer held liable for employee's scheme to defraud government by 
inducing the government to pay for oil not delivered to the government, since employee 
was acting within the scope of his employment duties and was at least partially motivated 
to serve the company). 
47 Wang, 398 Mass. at 860, 501 N.E.2d at 1167. 
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however, the manager also sought to further Wang's interests.48 The 
Court interpreted the trial judge's findings to mean that the manager had 
a dual motive: self-interest and cost avoidance for Wang.49 The Court 
held the respondeat superior doctrine applicable where the employee acts 
out of partial motivation to serve the employer, and therefore held Wang 
liable under the Act for the manager's wilful misconduct.50 The Court 
remanded the case to the superior court for .assessment of damages 
between double and treble BI's actual damages resulting from the con-
tract termination. 51 
The Wang Court properly reversed the trial court's multiple damage 
denial, but confused two independent issues in the process. The Court 
immediately addressed the application of the respondeat superior doc-
trine without discussing the appropriateness of an employer's vicarious 
liability for multiple damages under the Consumer Protection Act. 52 Fur-
thermore, the Court did not discuss the importance of the Wang execu-
tives' negligence to its award of multiple damages. Although the Court's 
straightforward application of agency rules suggests that the company's 
negligence was not a factor, the practitioner may wonder whether a 
company which innocently commits an unfair or deceptive trade practice 
will be subject to multiple damage liability as a result of an employee's 
wilful misconduct. 53 
One of the policies behind the Consumer Protection Act is to deter 
dishonest business dealings. 54 The multiple damage provision of the Act 
48 I d. The trial court had ruled that Wang's junior in-house tax manager hoped to realize 
for Wang the benefits of the BI contract without cost or concern for Wang's contractual 
obligations. Jd. at 857, 501 N.E.2d at 1165. 
49 Jd. at 860, 501 N.E.2d at 1167. 
50 Jd. at 860-61, 501 N.E.2d at 1167. 
51 Id. 
52 Jd. The Court could have looked to its own edict from Heller v. Silverbranch Constr. 
Corp., 376 Mass. 621, 626, 382 N.E.2d 1065, 1070 (1978), that the unfairness or deceptive-
ness of trade practices is to be evaluated in light of the policy underlying the Act and from 
the case's inherent circumstances. The same approach should control the Court's analysis 
of the availability of multiple damages. 
53 Although the Court did not address this point specifically, the only logical conclusion 
to be drawn from the Court's holding is that the company executives' negligence was based 
either on a finding by the trial court or a concession by Wang that the executives knew or 
should have known, with reasonable diligence, that the contract termination constituted an 
unfair or deceptive trade practice. 
54 See Manning v. Zuckerman, 388 Mass. 8, 12, 444 N.E.2d 1262, 1264-65 (1983), where 
the Court stated: 
The legislature originally enacted c. 93A to improve the commercial relationship be-
tween consumers and businessmen. By requiring proper disclosure of relevant in-
formation and proscribing unfair or decept;ve acts or practices, the Legislature strove 
to encourage ·more equitable behavior in the marketplace. See Commonwealth v. 
Decotis, 366 Mass. 234, 238, 316 N.E.2d 748, 752 (1974). By the addition of§ 11 by 
20
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1986 [1986], Art. 4
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1986/iss1/4
§ 1.3 CONTRACTS 21 
is designed to penalize those who engage in unfair or deceptive trade 
practices. 55 The degree of the defendant's culpability controls the appli-
cability and amount of multiple damages. 56 Thus, although negligence is 
not a defense to an unfair or deceptive trade practice claim, it does not 
give rise to a claim for multiple damages under the Act. 57 Multiple dam-
ages are a punitive element intended to deter wilful violations of the 
Act. 58 
Subjecting companies to multiple damages for negligently relying on 
an employee's bad faith conduct partially calculated to serve the company 
furthers this policy of deterrence. It encourages business executives to 
scrutinize their employees' actions and to insist on good faith represen-
tations within the organization, at least where other individuals or busi-
nesses will be involved. A system which does not impose liability on 
employers for their employees' unfair or deceptive practices would not 
provide the desired deterrent. 
A decision in Wang's favor on the multiple damage issue would have 
been inimical to the policy which the Act embodies. Ignorance of the 
true facts would become the popular defense of all employers accused 
of unfair or deceptive practices. According to basic tort principles, if a 
person is not and should not be aware of the illegal or harmful nature of 
his or her act, having exercised due diligence, the person has not acted 
negligently. While few companies are likely to encourage deceit and bad 
faith by their employees, some would intentionally fail to investigate 
employee recommendations beneficial to the company but violative of 
/d. 
St. 1972, c. 614, § 2 (see Nader v. Citron, 372 Mass. 96, %-97, 360 N.E.2d 870, 870 
[1977]) these protections were extended to persons engaged in trade or commerce 
in business transactions with other persons also engaged in trade or commerce. 
55 See International Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 387 Mass. 841, 856, 443 N.E.2d 1308, 
1317-18 (1983). 
56 /d. See also Qantel, 571 F. Supp. at 1374 (court ruled that the fraud was not egregious 
enough to warrant greater than double damages). 
57 Qantel, 571 F. Supp. at 1374-75 (court noted that negligence would not present the 
requisite culpable state of mind for multiple damage award, and went on to find that a 
speaker making a statement without firm knowledge of its truth or falsity constitutes a 
wilful violation); Linthicum, 379 Mass. at 388, 398 N.E.2d at 487-88 (breach of contractual 
warranties which was primarily attributable to inexperienced and unsupervised employees 
held to be negligent violation not compensable by multiple damages). 
58 See McGrath v. Mishara, 386 Mass. 74, 85, 434 N.E.2d 1215, 1222 (1982). See also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 909, comment b (1982), which reads in pertinent part: 
/d. 
Although there has been no fault on the part of a corporation or other employer, if a 
person acting in a managerial capacity either does an outrageous act or approves of 
the act by a subordinate, the imposition of punitive damages upon the employer 
serves as a deterrent to the employment of unfit persons for important positions. 
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the Act. If intentional ignorance could be proven, the company execu-
tives would be charged with constructive knowledge since they should 
have been aware of the employee's malicious conduct. 59 Intentional ig-
norance would therefore not provide a defense for the company. The 
victim will generally find it very difficult, however, to prove that the 
company purposely remained ignorant of their employee's secret mo-
tives. In short, if ignorance of the situation shields a corporation from 
punitive damage liability, the incentive for demanding scrupulous conduct 
by its employees will be diminished. 
The Wang case mixes elements of two common scenarios which the 
courts have addressed to create a new situation. Where an employee 
intentionally commits an unfair trade practice within his scope of em-
iployment which requires no ratification or execution by superiors because 
of the authority vested in the employee, the company is liable for multiple 
damages. 60 However, the company is liable only for single damages where 
its executives negligently violate the Act, with no intentional misconduct 
underlying the violation. 61 In Wang, the executives who wrongfully ter-
minated Bl's contract were merely negligent, suggesting a single damage 
remedy, but acted on the intentionally deceitful representations of its 
employee, thereby raising the multiple damage issue. The Court imputed 
the employee's intent to the company and awarded BI multiple damages. 
Another mixed-intent scenario which could arise is where the employee 
intentionally misrepresents the facts to the decision-maker, as in Wang, 
but the executives commit an unfair trade practice innocently rather than 
negligently because they have no reason to know or suspect that their 
information is false or their conduct is improper. The Court's straight-
forward, mechanical application of the respondeat superior test in Wang, 
with no discussion of mitigating factors or additional considerations im-
plicated by the Act's purpose, suggests that the Court would also impute 
59 See supra note 53. 
60 See, e.g., Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc. 396 Mass. 760, 778-79, 
489 N.E.2d 185, 197-98 (1986) (company liable for multiple damages where one of its 
principals, acting on its behalf, knowingly misstated facts in a complaint against a compet-
itor, used the litigation as a marketing tool against the competitor, and misrepresented to 
the competitor that he was handing over his only copy of a circulation list owned by the 
competitor). 
61 See, e.g., Wasserman, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 680-81, 497 N.E.2d at 24. In absolving 
the owner of a commercial property of liability for more than single damages to his lessee 
for refusing to execute a new lease negotiated by the owner's apparent agent, thereby 
foiling an attempted sale by the lessee to the prospective new tenant, the court commented, 
"[t]his is not a case involving the intentional employment of sharp practices; rather it is 
one in which an otherwise justifiable business decision entailed, as an unintentional and 
presumably unwanted side effect, injury to one protected by the statute." Id. at 681, 497 
N.E.2d at 25. See also Linthicum, 379 Mass. at 388, 398 N.E.2d at 487-88. 
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the employee's wilfulness onto a company which innocently violates the 
Act. 
The Court noted the Wang executives' negligence, but did so simply 
in a factual context and not as an element in the imputation of wrongful 
intent. The attorney litigating an "innocent violation induced by inten-
tional misconduct" case must consider the possible distinction from the 
Wang case. Assuming, however, that the employee's conduct satisfies 
the three prongs of the respondeat superior test: kind of work employed 
to perform, within time and space limits, and at least partially motivated 
to serve the employer, the C,ourt most likely will hold the company liable 
for multiple damages. If the court looks beyond the mechanical rule to 
the policies behind the multiple damage provisions, 62 the result should 
be the same. In order to provide the necessary incentive for firms to 
scrutinize their employees' conduct, the company must be fully account-
able for its practices. Thus, both the Wang Court's vicarious liability rule 
and the deterrence policy behind the Act's multiple damage section sup-
port an imputation of an employee's malicious intent to the company 
which innocently relies on the employee's representations. 
In conclusion, a primary purpose of the multiple damage provision of 
the Act is to provide a deterrent to unfair trade practices. The Court has 
promoted this policy by holding a corporation liable for multiple damages 
under the Act for its executives' reliance on intentional misrepresenta-
tions of an employee resulting in a violation of the Act. Where the 
employee has acted within the scope of his employment, the company is 
properly liable for the conduct. The imposition of punitive damages 
provides a necessary incentive for businesses to scrutinize their employ-
ees' work and to encourage honest trade and commerce. The Court did 
not discuss the importance of the executives' negligence to its decision 
to impute the employee's wrongful intent onto the company. Neverthe-
less, if the company had innocently relied on the employee's misrepre-
sentations, both the respondeat superior doctrine and the multiple dam-
age provision's underlying policy would have likely supported an award 
of multiple damages. 
62 See supra note 54 for a discussion of the policies underlying § 11. 
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